

The Other Clash of Civilizations: Samuel Huntington and American Civil Military Relations

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Abstract

The Other Clash of Civilizations: Samuel Huntington and American Civil Military Relations by MAJ Bryan J. Dodd, Army, 65 pages.

The quality of the relationship between military commanders, senior government officials, and the head of state greatly influences the effectiveness of military force employment. Samuel Huntington explored this phenomenon, among others, in his seminal work, *The Soldier and the State*, and in the fifty-five years since its publication, history has given numerous new examples with which to test his ideas about executive civil-military relations.

This work examines three American civil-military relationships using two frameworks presented by Huntington. Huntington's frames illustrate more clearly how the relationships in these three presidential administrations—Wilson, Truman, and Johnson—functioned and how the level of functionality influenced the prosecution of a war. The first framework consists of the three types of civil military relationships – balanced pattern, coordinated scheme and vertical pattern. The second framework is the patterns of civil-military relations. He addresses five combinations of three variables to explain these patterns. The three variables are political ideology, level of military political power and level of military professionalism. Huntington does not explicitly detail a correlation between these two frameworks; however, this work will explore their association to determine why problems existed and what actions can establish a more effective civil-military relationship. Additionally, an exploration of the backgrounds and experiences of the individuals involved attempts to determine if there is any correlation between their past and the effectiveness of their executive-level relationships.

Although Huntington considers the balanced type of civil-military relationship the most effective, the Constitution poorly positions military leaders to influence the construct directly. Military leaders can have the greatest influence, albeit indirectly, through the behaviors defining Huntington's patterns – political ideology, level of military political power and level of military professionalism. They must approach political ideology carefully, but the military can improve the trust of their civilian leaders, regardless of ideology, by maintaining high levels of military professionalism. This may not create the desired balance, but it can aid in having a voice in the dialog. The greatest degree of impact that military leaders can have on the type of relationship they have with their civilian masters is through maintaining the appropriate amount of military political power, which adjusting, can make the overall relationship more effective.

Regardless of the patterns or type of relationship, it is ultimately the responsibility of all partners within the civil-military relationship to make the relationship work. Understanding the nature of these relationships, their typologies, and the patterns of interaction that influence their construction, maintenance, and potential failure, is the best means available to develop strategies for making these relationships cooperative and successful.

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Introduction

After launching the war in Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld began working with General Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM commander to determine the requirements for the invasion of Iraq. The Department of Defense's standing contingency plans for a potential war with Iraq anticipated a required troop strength of 500,000. This was also the Joint Staff's best estimate of the requirement to unseat Saddam Hussein and secure Iraq's potential weapons of mass destruction. Rumsfeld clearly disagreed with this estimate and considered the planning incomplete and that the Joint Staff would continue looking at the problem. Days later, the joint staff presented a plan requiring about 300,000 troops. President Bush was wary of such a large commitment on top of the operational requirements in Afghanistan and questioned the number of troops. Rumsfeld overrode the Joint Staff, suggesting that the numbers presented were merely preliminary, overly cautious, estimates and that the Joint Staff would work to bring the numbers down to more manageable levels, a number that started with an initial invasion force of 145,000 with an eventual buildup to 275,000. These numbers still fell short of the estimated 385,000 troops required to conduct stability operations in Iraq.¹

President Bush, although concerned about troop levels and the timetable associated with their deployment, did not necessarily disagree with the Joint Staff. In truth, it was Rumsfeld who disagreed with the Joint Staff's numbers, feeling that such troop requirements were far too high. He viewed the plans, as developed by the Joint Staff, required too many troops, would require too much in logistical support and strategic transport, and would take too long to execute. Therefore, Rumsfeld forced his own plan through the military and political bureaucracies, one that fit with his vision. In execution, it appeared initially to be a resounding success: Baghdad fell quickly,

¹ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 3-5, 19-23, 53. Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco*, (New York: Penguin Group, 2007), 68-76, 96-100, 120-123. Rowan Scarborough, *Rumsfeld's War* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2004), 43-48.

and the regime removed from power, with very few American casualties. It was not long, however, before the second-guessing began, as Iraq was looted and vandalized, the organized military resistance consisting mostly of regime loyalists descended into a violent, ideologically based insurrection, and the military began to complain that the DOD had not authorized enough troops to do the job.²

The quality of the relationship between military commanders, senior government officials, and the head of state greatly influences the effectiveness of military force employment. Samuel Huntington explored this phenomenon, among others, in his seminal work, *The Soldier and the State*, and in the fifty-five years since its publication, history has given numerous new examples with which to test his ideas about executive civil-military relations.³ Despite this evidence, many have argued that it has not been so much the relationships, but rather individual personality that has led civil-military relations at the executive level to be, at times, dysfunctional. This paper explores the role that personal background and experience plays in the formation of these relationships, and the degree to which the relationships are successful.

It is important for the military professional and senior civilian leaders to recognize the characteristics that define civil-military relationships, which Huntington has divided into three archetypes, and the difficulties associated with each. Understanding the nature of these relationship types, and the characteristics that identify each, can aid in avoiding mistakes in the future that have the potential to weaken civil-military cooperation at the highest levels of government. Armed with this knowledge, it is possible to pursue a more ideal civil-military relationship at the executive level while failure to either recognize these characteristics or ignore

² Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 3-5, 27-30, 498. Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco*, (New York: Penguin Group, 2007), 168-172.

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 186-188.

their ramifications can lead to the same significant difficulties experienced in the recent past. While attaining this ideal relationship, which Huntington described as a balanced relationship, is elusive, knowledgeable and self-aware leaders can avoid the potential pitfalls that Huntington identifies and work for the most effective relationship possible. Failing to build an effective relationship at the executive level will inhibit the military leader's ability to link the national strategies with the required tactical actions, reducing the effectiveness in the application of operational art.

However, the type of relationship is not itself indicative of success or failure. All three of Huntington's archetypes have occurred in American history, with varying degrees of success. On the other hand, the level of influence that personal background and individual experiences have on the civil-military relationship has been more difficult to quantify. Huntington offers an important framework to analyze their relevancy, although he only implies a linkage. The case studies presented here show that Huntington's behavioral patterns found within civil-military relations contribute directly to the types of civil-military relationships established and, more importantly, to the level of success they achieve.⁴

Methodology

This work reviews the civil-military relationships of three American cases. The first of these case studies examines the relationship between President Woodrow Wilson and General John Pershing in the context of World War I. The second examines the relationship between President Harry Truman and his senior military commander, General Douglas MacArthur, during the early months of the Korean War. The final case study examines the relationship between

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 89-94.

President Lyndon Johnson, the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and theater commander General William Westmoreland during the Vietnam War.

An examination of each of these cases, using the work of Samuel P. Huntington and his framework regarding civil-military relations, illustrates more clearly how the relationships in these three distinct presidential administrations functioned and the impact that this functionality had on the prosecution of a war. Additionally, an exploration of the backgrounds and experiences of the individuals involved attempts to determine if there is any correlation between their past and the effectiveness of their executive-level relationships.

Huntington offers three types of associations to describe civil-military relations and admits that there are other solutions to the problems involving civil-military relations at the executive-level. However, he asserts many of these solutions are not suitable when examined in the context of the American system.⁵

The first type is the balanced pattern. He describes this type of relationship as one in which the president takes on a solely political function and exerts only a “general supervision” regarding the military. Likewise, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for all political aspects regarding the military, providing a buffer between the military commander and the president, retarding any political involvement on the part of the commander. The military commander maintains responsibility for military matters and does not become embroiled in political decisions. Military leaders have little to no direct contact with the president and the exercise of military command stops with the military commander and does not extend to civilian leadership. In this balanced arrangement, the Secretary of Defense is subordinate to the president and the military commander is subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. This civil-military arrangement

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 186, 188-189.

takes full advantage of the civilian aspect of control while capitalizing on the expertise of the military. An example of this type of relationship is the one that existed between President Wilson and the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) during WWI, General Pershing. President Wilson appropriately realized the official entry of the United States as a relevant actor in the international political scene. His reliance on General Pershing characterizes his application of the balanced pattern. He gave General Pershing broad, but effective, guidance regarding the application of the AEF and overall responsibility for military matters. This gave President Wilson the freedom to concentrate on the political decisions regarding the commitment of American forces and conflict resolution. Huntington contends that the balanced pattern is the most effective of the three types of control. However, he also believes that it is the most difficult relationship to achieve and maintain. Interestingly, Huntington states that, “The American constitutional system thus does not facilitate the stable existence of a balanced pattern of executive civil-military relations.”⁶ This statement helps to explain President Wilson’s earlier direct application of military force in Mexico before WWI. The civil-military relationship in his early administration better characterizes Huntington’s second type, a coordinated scheme, as indicated by his intervention “in professional military planning and command where he has no special competence.”⁷ In most cases, the remaining two types of associations Huntington describes characterize the relationships that result and these “tend to weaken military professionalism and civilian control.”⁸

As mentioned briefly above, Huntington’s second type of association is the coordinated scheme. In this relationship, the president operates, as in the balanced pattern, exclusively in the

⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 189.

⁷ Ibid., 188.

⁸ Ibid., 186-188.

political arena. However, his Secretary of Defense now shoulders administrative tasks associated with the military establishment. This command relationship divides the chain of command and gives the military commander direct access to the president. Huntington, in his description of the coordinated scheme, warns of the dangers in this type of relationship.⁹

The scope of authority of the military chief is limited to military matters, but the level of his authority with direct access to the President involves him in political issues. The President is normally too busy with other affairs to devote sufficient attention to the interrelation of political and military policies, and the military chief consequently has to make political decisions.¹⁰

While the coordinated scheme is in keeping with constitutional theory by involving only the president in the military chain of command, it also jeopardizes civilian control by affording the combatant commander that direct access to the president.¹¹ The relationship between President Truman and General MacArthur clearly demonstrates the coordinated scheme. While President Truman and General MacArthur rarely met personally, MacArthur was afforded direct access. This, coupled with MacArthur's propensity for political involvement, resulted in him making decisions and public statements that had political ramifications. The value in studying this type of relationship is that it can arm the military professional and senior civilian leaders with the ability to recognize its emergence. This knowledge can prevent the associated difficulties and inefficiencies that it represents.

The final type of relationship that Huntington articulates is the vertical pattern. This type of association places the same responsibilities on the Secretary of Defense and the military leadership, with commanders subordinated to the Secretary of Defense. To maintain his connection with the military and to exercise his duties as the Commander-in-Chief, the president

⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 188.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

inserts his Secretary of Defense into the chain of command. This makes the Secretary of Defense de-facto Deputy Commander in Chief eliminating direct access to the President by the military commander.¹² The interaction between President Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and General Westmoreland is an example of Huntington's vertical pattern. In this relationship, President Johnson relied heavily on Secretary McNamara to perform duties normally associated with the Commander-in-Chief enabling Johnson to concentrate more on domestic policy. Secretary McNamara's role as Deputy Commander in Chief diminished General Westmoreland's authority on military matters, insulated President Johnson from the true military assessment of the situation in Vietnam, and resulted in discontinuity between strategy and tactics. Unfortunately, some aspects of this relationship have repeated recently, including the role performed by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld during the Bush administration.¹³ Failure to acknowledge the shortcomings past civil-military relationships may mean additional repetition in the future.

Because relationships between people, by their very nature, are the product the convergence, or sometimes divergence, of individuals, an examination of the relevant personalities and individual backgrounds of the participants in these relationships may provide insights into how the disposition of the individual influences the type of relationship pursued, which may help in avoiding such problems in future civil-military relationships. Tensions between civil and military authorities, and their associated aims, have existed in these relations throughout United States history.¹⁴ The value in examining the individuals as well as the relationships between President Wilson and General Pershing; President Truman and General MacArthur; and finally President Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and General

¹² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 188.

¹³ Rowan Scarborough, *Rumsfeld's War* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2004), 111-144.

¹⁴ Charles A. Stevenson, *Warriors and Politicians* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 194-195.

Westmoreland is that it allows an examiner to determine if anything in the personal backgrounds of the people involved correlates to the failure or success of the civil-military relationship.

Huntington provides value when analyzing these personal backgrounds, through his discussion of political ideologies and the patterns of civil-military relations.¹⁵ He lists four political ideologies: liberalism, Marxism, fascism and conservatism. Of the four, two are pertinent when examining the American system--liberalism and conservatism. Individualism is central to Huntington's notion of liberalism, which "emphasizes the reason and moral dignity of the individual and opposes political, economic, and social restraints upon individual liberty." and "believes that the natural relation [between men] is peace."¹⁶ Huntington's conservatism, on the other hand, finds its basis in "its recognition of the role of power in human relations, its acceptance of existing institutions, its limited goals, and its distrust of grand designs" and therefore "is at one with the military ethic."¹⁷ To avoid confusion with the popular definition of conservatism he adds that it "refers to the philosophy of Burke, and not to the meaning given this term in popular political parlance in the United States to refer to the laissez-faire, property rights form of liberalism exemplified, for instance, by Herbert Hoover."¹⁸ He contends that conservatism is the closest in line with the military mind, but liberalism most often defines American politics. Liberalism believes that the natural state is one of peace, and therefore wars fought to support national policy are not moral, though they may support wars that reinforce ideals of freedom and justice.¹⁹ These definitions may shed light on the friction within the civil-

¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 90-97.

¹⁶ Ibid., 90.

¹⁷ Ibid., 93.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., 90-91.

military relationships explored in the following sections, as contending views of the world and of the role of the military and government struggle for dominance.

Huntington's patterns of civil-military relations consist of five different combinations of three variables. The first of these variables is the political ideology and whether or not it is supportive of the military and in this study focuses on the pro-military ideology, conservatism, and the anti-military ideology, liberalism. The second variable is the level of military political power, examples being General MacArthur, who exhibited a high level of political power and conversely, Generals Pershing and Westmoreland. The final variable is the level of military professionalism, either high or low. Huntington bases this level on the senior officer corps and is not necessarily on the level of military preparedness. The level of professionalism remains high throughout the three case studies. This work focuses on four of these combinations or patterns of civil military relations.²⁰

Recognizing the prevalent political ideology, level of military political power and level of military professionalism can help reduce friction in the civil-military relationship. This can be achieved by accepting the current situation and avoiding any difficulties associated with them or, military and civilian leaders may seek to adjust the level of military political power to affect the relationship.

To avoid the potential confusion caused by Huntington's use of the term "pattern" in two different contexts, further references to Huntington's types of associations will use the single terms balanced, coordinated, and vertical. The term "pattern" will be reserved for use in the context of Huntington's patterns of civil-military relations, which are made up through the

²⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 94-97.

interaction of the three variables of political ideology, levels of military political power, and levels of military professionalism.

President Woodrow Wilson and General John Pershing

Democratic President Woodrow Wilson maintained strict control over the military during his early presidency, making him unpopular with the majority of the Army's senior commanders, most of whom considered themselves Republicans.²¹ This fostered a relationship between the Commander in Chief and military that Huntington would describe as the coordinated type. An example that illustrates Wilson's level of involvement in military affairs is his direct involvement in America's interventions in Mexico early in his administration. As a leader of the Progressive Movement, President Wilson's approaches to both domestic and foreign policy were liberal. By Huntington's definition, liberals are uncomfortable with military actions and wars fought solely to support political policies, and this helps to explain his ignoring the advice of his military commanders on Mexico.²²

His popularity also suffered because of the sixteen years of Republican leadership that had occupied the White House before his arrival. These feelings toward the new Commander-in-Chief also included then Brigadier General Pershing who, in less than five years, would command the AEF in France.²³ President Wilson's decision to involve the United States in World War I signaled the shift in the civil-military relationship. The liberal ideals held by President Wilson

²¹ Frederick S. Calhoun, *The Wilsonian Way of War: American Armed Power from Veracruz to Vladivostok* (Thesis no. T28722. USA, 1983), 54, 57-58.

²² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 90.

²³ Frederick S. Calhoun, *The Wilsonian Way of War: American Armed Power from Veracruz to Vladivostok* (Thesis no. T28722. USA, 1983), 59-61, 114. August Heckscher, *Woodrow Wilson* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991), 446.

made him more comfortable with the application of military force and involvement in a war fought to support higher ideals such as freedom. This increased comfort allowed President Wilson to relinquish more control over military affairs to General Pershing and thereby allowed the president to focus his attention at the national strategic level and with foreign policy.

The study of these two men demonstrates wide differences in upbringing, experiences, and personal as well as political views. Their relationship illustrates Huntington's third pattern of civil-military relations, which in this case characterized an anti-military ideology fueled by liberalism, low military political power due to Pershing's reluctance to become embroiled in political debate, and finally high military professionalism within the senior officer corps. Despite these differences and President Wilson's early tendency to maintain strict control over military affairs, the relationship and method of control exercised by President Wilson evolved over time so that by World War I it proved to be an illustration of Huntington's most successful type of association: the balanced relationship.

World War I and the Relationship between Wilson and Pershing

As mentioned earlier, the relationship maintained by President Wilson and General Pershing is an example of the balanced approach. During WWI, the president allowed General Pershing to take full responsibility for military matters, while he and his Secretary of Defense maintained purely political roles. This section explores the nature of the relationship that existed between President Wilson and Major General Pershing before his departure for France, the strategic guidance conveyed by the president to Pershing before his departure for Europe, and some of the problems that developed between Wilson and Pershing during the war and the post-war period.

The personal relationship, which has often existed between the Commander in Chief and senior military leaders throughout America's history, did not exist between President Wilson and General Pershing. While this absence of a personal relationship is understandable during

Pershing's command of the Punitive Expedition in Mexico, it is more difficult to understand when historians view General Pershing's role as the commander of the AEF in France. The fact that General Pershing did not care for the policies of President Wilson might contribute to this problem, but then again, Pershing's attitudes reflected those of a majority of the Army officer corps at that time. Even the officers that did not claim Republican affiliation had little idea how interact with a Democratic president. Coupled with his repeated refusals to accept military advice of senior military leaders, President Wilson did little to gain anything more than dutiful obedience and loyalty among the majority of military officers.²⁴ In fact, the majority opinion of General Pershing's selection as the commander of United States forces was as follows: "Stiff, sharp-eyed, independent-minded, Pershing was no enthusiast for Wilson's policies, and his appointment as commander-in-chief signaled that the war was to be run by professional soldiers, with a minimum of political interference."²⁵

Responding to the ongoing conflict in Europe, President Wilson took a leading role in the application of diplomatic and economic elements of national power.²⁶ His efforts in the military domain were another matter. While, by his own admission, President Wilson did not view himself as an expert in tactics, this had not prevented him from becoming heavily involved in military's operational decision-making during the United States military's involvement in Mexico.²⁷ That said, President Wilson did not interfere with General Pershing's military operations in France. Whether because of the less than decisive outcomes of our military actions in Mexico, or the

²⁴ Frederick S. Calhoun, *The Wilsonian Way of War: American Armed Power from Veracruz to Vladivostok* (Thesis no. T28722. USA, 1983), 59-61.

²⁵ August Heckscher, *Woodrow Wilson* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991), 446.

²⁶ John Milton Cooper Jr., *Woodrow Wilson* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 362-372. August Heckscher, *Woodrow Wilson* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991), 423-428.

²⁷ Frederick S. Calhoun, *The Wilsonian Way of War: American Armed Power from Veracruz to Vladivostok* (Thesis no. T28722. USA, 1983), 53-54.

sheer scale of the anticipated military involvement in France, Wilson deferred to military leaders to execute military operations in France.²⁸

Secretary of War Baker selected Major General Pershing to command the AEF and the Secretary earned the respect of the military throughout the conflict. President Wilson endorsed the selection and the two met only briefly before General Pershing's departure. Pershing also met with Secretary Baker who gave him very broad guidance for the employment of United States forces in Europe. Pershing surmised his initial orders in the following manner. First, he needed to assemble a staff and proceed to Europe as quickly as possible. Second, Pershing would receive additional guidance when the president concluded United States forces had completed military operations and could return home.²⁹ President Wilson was only insistent in two regards as to the involvement those forces. First, he directed General Pershing to employ the AEF as an independent force and not as individual or small unit replacements for other Allied forces. Second, President Wilson highlighted the importance of General Pershing's cooperation with Allied commanders.³⁰ With this broad guidance, General Pershing departed for France.

The wide-ranging guidance given to Pershing and the trust that President Wilson bestowed upon him as the AEF commander, resulted in an effective civil-military relationship. Throughout the conduct of the war, the AEF performed honorably and admirably and the only sign of strain in the relationship between the President and his top commander came at the war's conclusion. In early November 1918, President Wilson issued a cable to the Allied Supreme War

²⁸ Frederick S. Calhoun, *The Wilsonian Way of War: American Armed Power from Veracruz to Vladivostok* (Thesis no. T28722. USA, 1983), 283. August Heckscher, *Woodrow Wilson* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991), 446. Jim Lacey, *Pershing* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 91, 96-97.

²⁹ Jim Lacey, *Pershing* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 91.

³⁰ Frederick S. Calhoun, *The Wilsonian Way of War: American Armed Power from Veracruz to Vladivostok* (Thesis no. T28722. USA, 1983), 309. Jim Lacey, *Pershing* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 96-97.

Council that most viewed as critical of the Council's armistice terms and took the opportunity to proffer a more lenient approach. Wilson invited General Pershing to provide any additional ideas, from the military commander's standpoint, worthy of consideration. General Pershing drafted a response that ran counter to President Wilson's position, supporting instead the position of the Supreme War Council, and sent this response directly to the war council while bypassing President Wilson. Secretary of War Baker obtained a copy of the response and informed the president. As a result, Wilson directed Secretary Baker to draft a letter of reprimand, which they ultimately never gave to General Pershing. The president dismissed the incident on 7 November describing the event as an oversight brought on by Pershing's flu like illness that he experienced at the time.³¹ This incident highlights the only time that the President Wilson questioned General Pershing's loyalty during his command of the AEF.

Of interest when examining the relationship between President Wilson and General Pershing during WWI are indicators of the potential difficulties that could have, and to a very limited extent did arise. To better understand root of these potential problems and better appreciate the significance of their avoidance, it is essential to review the background of these two men. This examination will point out the polarity of their backgrounds and provide a better appreciation to the reader of the hurdles these two men overcame to work together effectively for the common good.

Presidential Background

To understand President Wilson's perspective it is important to look at his background. President Wilson, born in Staunton, Virginia on December 28, 1856, was the nation's first

³¹ Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: The life and Times of John J. Pershing* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 982-983. Gene Smith, *Until the Last Trumpet Sounds: The Life of General of the Armies, John J. Pershing* (New York: Wiley, 1998), 200.

southern president since the Civil War. Wilson's family had very shallow roots in America. His mother, Jessie Woodrow was an immigrant from Scotland and his father Joseph Wilson was the first generation of Wilsons born in America. His father, a Presbyterian minister, identified with the Confederate cause during the Civil War and served in the Confederate Army for a year before resuming his duties as a civilian minister. He was also a founding member of the Southern Presbyterian Church when the church split following the outset of the war. Woodrow Wilson also proved to be deeply religious and officially joined the Presbyterian Church at the age of seventeen.³²

President Wilson received his education at Princeton, and would later serve as that institution's president for eight years at which point he ran for and was elected Governor of New Jersey, serving from 1911 to 1913.³³ Although this was his only political office before serving as the Twenty-Eighth president of the United States, he quickly became a leader in the progressive movement.³⁴ This movement recognized that knowledge had increased to such a point that it was now impossible for an individual to be an expert in all fields. This view forced individuals to concentrate on a single field of study and to rely on experts from other fields to compensate for their lack of knowledge in other more technical areas. This belief characterized his relationship with the military. "Wilson established overall policy and guiding principles of action, but he turned to the armed services for the details of implementation." This is to say that President Wilson did not want to become involved in the tactics surrounding military action; however, in his initial expeditions, he afforded the military very little autonomy. He was immediate to

³² August Heckscher, *Woodrow Wilson* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991), 6-7, 10, 12, 15.

³³ Ibid., 139, 203, 215, 265.

³⁴ Frederick S. Calhoun, *The Wilsonian Way of War: American Armed Power from Veracruz to Vladivostok* (Thesis no. T28722. USA, 1983), 53.

admonish military leaders when he felt that they overstepped his preconceived limits.³⁵ The entrance of the United States into WWI and the subsequent peace process represents the most significant of Wilson's foreign policy actions. However, to understand the civil-military relationship before this event, it is important to review the United States military intervention in Mexico.

The American intervention in the Mexican Revolution illustrates the extent of Wilson's belief in strict civilian control of the military. In Wilson's first use of military force in the execution of foreign policy, he made decisions and directly opposed the advice of his military experts. The Army War College plans that recommended a course of action for how the United States should deal with the Mexican Revolution called for the full invasion and seizure of Mexico. This initial plan, developed in 1914, required more than 250,000 military members in the execution of land operations alone. A later plan, preceding General Pershing's pursuit of Poncho Villa, required as many as 400,000 men. President Wilson viewed the War College's pursuit of full-scale invasion of Mexico as an intrusion by the military and an attempt on their part to influence foreign policy.³⁶

In 1914, President Wilson authorized limited military action focused on seizing the port town of Veracruz. The goal of this action was to prevent Germany from shipping arms to Mexico and to put the United States in a position to influence future political settlements pertaining to Mexico in concert with other European powers. This goal foreshadowed his motivations to

³⁵ Frederick S. Calhoun, *The Wilsonian Way of War: American Armed Power from Veracruz to Vladivostok* (Thesis no. T28722. USA, 1983), 54.

³⁶ Ibid., 54-55.

involve the country in WWI. While the United States military succeeded in the seizure of Veracruz, it failed to bring about the influence that President Wilson sought.³⁷

In 1916, President Wilson ordered the United States Army to take action again, in response to a raid conducted by Poncho Villa into Columbus, New Mexico. The raid resulted in the deaths of sixteen United States citizens. The United States Army offered the president its plan to punish the Mexican government, which again called for the full-scale invasion of Mexico, this time involving as many as 400,000 men. The president chose to authorize limited military action, which again ran counter to the advice of his military leadership. The Army provided an explanation of the difficulties surrounding such an operation, but the president refused to change course.³⁸ The pursuit operation, commanded by General Pershing, failed to capture Poncho Villa. Furthermore, General Pershing encountered many of the difficulties that the Army had outlined in the original plan.³⁹

While not becoming involved in the tactical application of military power, President Wilson nonetheless ignored the strategic advice provided by the Army leadership. In these two initial attempts by the president to apply military power, he was unsuccessful. It is possible that Wilson's unsuccessful early application of military power led to his decision to grant more autonomy to his military commander in WWI.

³⁷ Frederick S. Calhoun, *The Wilsonian Way of War: American Armed Power from Veracruz to Vladivostok* (Thesis no. T28722. USA, 1983), 79-87. John Milton Cooper Jr, *Woodrow Wilson* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 243-244. Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2008), 66-68. John G. Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Tony Smith, *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 32-35.

³⁸ Frederick S. Calhoun, *The Wilsonian Way of War: American Armed Power from Veracruz to Vladivostok* (Thesis no. T28722. USA, 1983), 91.

³⁹ Ibid., 113-114.

Pershing's Background

John Pershing was born in 1860 in Laclede, Missouri. Unlike President Wilson, Pershing's parents were pro-Union. Pershing's father, while not serving directly in the military, worked for and served Union forces after receiving an "appointment as sutler to the 18th Missouri Volunteer Infantry stationed in Laclede. When that unit moved on he provided similar services for the 1st Missouri State Militia regiment." His father also served as a Lieutenant for the home guard.⁴⁰ This position and the formation of the home guard came about following a Confederate raid on the town. This early exposure to the military and to war affected the young John Pershing.⁴¹ Though initially pursuing a teaching career for the two years following high school, Pershing received an appointment to and began attending West Point in 1882. Pershing graduated as the Captain of Cadets in 1886 and began his career as a cavalry lieutenant on America's western frontier. Pershing eventually served as a troop commander for an all black cavalry troop. This command resulted in his nickname of "Black Jack," given to him by his cadets while instructing at West Point.⁴²

During the Spanish American War, Pershing served with the United States 10th Cavalry in Cuba and following the cessation of hostilities, he served in Washington under the Assistant Secretary of War Meiklejohn. In this position, Pershing became responsible for directing operations within the territories gained by the United States during the war with Spain, including the Philippines. The beginnings of unrest in the Philippines set the stage for Pershing's rise to

⁴⁰ Gene Smith, *Until the Last Trumpet Sounds: The Life of General of the Armies, John J. Pershing* (New York: Wiley, 1998), 5. Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: The life and Times of John J. Pershing* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 5.

⁴¹ Jim Lacey, *Pershing* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 8. Gene Smith, *Until the Last Trumpet Sounds: The Life of General of the Armies, John J. Pershing* (New York: Wiley, 1998), 5.

⁴² Jim Lacey, *Pershing* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 13. Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: The life and Times of John J. Pershing* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 41, 49.

fame and his years of service there represented his last combat assignment before the commitment of United States forces in Mexico.⁴³

Brigadier General Pershing, now the commander of the 8th Infantry Brigade, led the “Punitive Expedition” into Mexico against Poncho Villa in March of 1916. President Wilson, once again, directed this military course of action against the advice of his senior military advisers.⁴⁴ As the operation began, Pershing immediately understood the futility of pursuing Poncho Villa, but executed his orders as directed.⁴⁵ The expedition lasted 11 months and it failed to achieve the ultimate strategic objective, the elimination of Poncho Villa. Following the failed military action in Mexico, now Major General Pershing served at Fort Sam Houston as the commander of the Southern Department. “A month later, President Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war on Germany, and Senator Warren telegraphed: WIRE ME TODAY WHETHER AND HOW MUCH YOU SPEAK, READ AND WRITE FRENCH.”⁴⁶

Conclusion

The most successful of the civil-military relations discussed in this work is that of President Wilson and General Pershing. Wilson’s early approach to civil-military relations as president reflects Huntington’s coordinated relationship. A characteristic that he used to describe this type is that it persuades the president to “try his hand at military affairs and to intervene in

⁴³ Jim Lacey, *Pershing* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 22, 33. Gene Smith, *Until the Last Trumpet Sounds: The Life of General of the Armies, John J. Pershing* (New York: Wiley, 1998), 50, 55-56. Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: The life and Times of John J. Pershing* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 174-175, 220, 231.

⁴⁴ Frederick S. Calhoun, *The Wilsonian Way of War: American Armed Power from Veracruz to Vladivostok* (Thesis no. T28722. USA, 1983), 91, 96.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 98.

⁴⁶ Gene Smith, *Until the Last Trumpet Sounds: The Life of General of the Armies, John J. Pershing* (New York: Wiley, 1998), 148.

professional military planning and command where he has no special competence.”⁴⁷ Wilson’s record with direct involvement in military actions in Mexico supports this idea. However, the entrance of the United States into WWI and the international stage resulted in a shift to a more balanced approach to civil-military relations. President Wilson provided clear and simple guidance to General Pershing, which enabled the military commander to execute his tasks with little interference from civilian leadership. Likewise, Secretary of War Newton Baker assumed a political role with his involvement with the AEF and concerned himself only with the military organization as a whole. The civilian leadership provided resources and support to General Pershing so long as there was no violation of the national strategic guidance provided to him.

The experience, personal dispositions, and political views of these two men are nearly opposite and would intuitively seem to impair the ability of the two men to formulate a personal relationship and to affect the formation of a professional dialogue. The political views of Wilson and Pershing serve as a stark point of contrast. Pershing was a Republican, as nearly all of the Army Officer Corps at the time. As previously mentioned, Wilson was a Progressive and his administration marked the end to sixteen years of Republican control of the White House. While this factor by itself did not lead to all of the friction in the relationship between the Commander and Chief and his generals, it does illustrate a potential friction point between the two men. Perhaps it is because Wilson was a Progressive, a movement that recognized that no one man could become an authority in all fields and that leaders would have to rely on the expertise of others to guide decision-making, the countered the tensions resulting from differences in political views. However, President Wilson did continue to remain sensitive to the military’s influence on national strategy. This sensitivity had led to confrontation between Wilson and senior military

⁴⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 188.

officers early in his administration. He repeatedly altered or rejected plans presented by his senior military leaders. United States involvement in WWI provided the first example of Wilson relinquishing his tight grip over the conduct of military operations.

The backgrounds and experiences of Wilson and Pershing aid in defining the resulting pattern of civil-military relations, as described by Huntington. Their relationship fits with his third pattern: anti-military ideology, low military political power, and high level of military professionalism. President Wilson's political approach was liberal, which is in keeping with the norm of American politics. General Pershing was true to the military mind and this prevented the high level of military political power that presents itself when looking at military leaders such as General Eisenhower and General MacArthur who, Huntington contends, are "unmilitary" military men.⁴⁸ Perhaps less defined by personal backgrounds, but still relevant in defining the pattern, is the high level of military professionalism of the Army. Huntington reinforces this assessment by stating that this pattern "prevailed in the United States from the rise of military professionalism after the Civil War until the beginning of WWII."⁴⁹ What Huntington does not address is how this pattern may correlate to the type of civil-military relationship, in this case a balanced relationship. However, this pattern does explain how President Wilson and General Pershing were able to overcome considerable personal differences in order to forge a successful civil-military relationship. The fact that General Pershing kept with aspects of the military mind and did not pursue a high level of military political power prevented conflict with President Wilson's anti-military ideology and the high level of military professionalism of the Army allowed the president to trust General Pershing with control over military affairs. Had the pattern been

⁴⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 369.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 97.

different, given all the facts reviewed in the case study, the resulting type of civil-military relationship would likely have been different and less effective.

Most intriguing is that this relationship between President Wilson and General Pershing had a strong potential for failure. First, the two men could hardly have been more different in the environments and experiences that shaped their upbringing. The political views of the two added to the intellectual and moral divide between them. Lastly, President Wilson's views pertaining to the roles and responsibilities of the Armed Forces in the formulation of national strategy constituted a departure from the normal practice of the preceding administration. Perhaps the magnitude of the coming United States involvement in WWI and President Wilson's failures in the application of military power to that point, specifically the expeditions in Mexico, forced these two men to cast aside their differences for the good of the nation.

The ability of these two men to put aside their differences and forge an effective relationship stands in contrast to the remaining case studies reviewed in this work. President Wilson and General Pershing benefitted from what Huntington describes as the most effective type of civil-military relationship, but more important than this alone, is the ability of General Pershing to use the proper approach to level of military political power that ensures its effectiveness. The next two case studies reflect the less optimal, according to Huntington, types of civil-military relationships. Furthermore, these two studies show how the improper balance of the variables associated with the patterns of civil-military relationships exacerbate the shortcomings of the coordinated and vertical types.

President Harry Truman and General Douglas MacArthur

The most unsuccessful of the relationships examined here existed between President Truman and General MacArthur. President Truman assumed the presidency following the death of the popular wartime president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he narrowly won reelection in 1948.

The seemingly invulnerable and publicly admired General Douglas MacArthur saw his military career end during Truman's administration.

The relationship the Truman had with the military and more specifically with General MacArthur typifies Huntington's coordinated type. This is primarily due to the amount of direct presidential access granted to General MacArthur, and MacArthur's willingness to involve himself with politics and to make decisions regarding the war in Korea that had political ramifications beyond his scope of responsibility. The issue becomes more confused when attempting to identify the pattern of civil-military relationship that describes their association. Looking at the pattern as purely an interaction between President Truman and the military, it has the characteristics of Huntington's fourth pattern of civil-military relations and has a pro-military ideology, a high level of military political power, and a high level of military professionalism. President Truman's policies toward the Korean conflict lend credence to the notion that the relationship pattern consisted of a pro-military ideology. The strategic goals were limited and sought only limited gains, primarily the restoration of the international border and was not defined as total military victory as our policies were defined with our involvement in WWII.⁵⁰ The difficulty in assigning the appropriate pattern to this relationship becomes apparent when examining the political ideology with respect to domestic policy and national opinion. President Truman's domestic policy was liberal in nature and the overall opinion of the American public supported liberal approaches. This meant that the American public would accept a conservative approach to the application of military power for only a limited time.⁵¹ For the purposes of framing the personal backgrounds and the correlation of Huntington's pattern to the type of relationship, this work considers the political ideology as pro-military. Regarding the level of

⁵⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 389.

⁵¹ Ibid., 391.

military political power, this study highlights MacArthur's willingness to involve himself in politics and his personal and military background discussed in the study will illustrate this assertion.

The case study shows that it was MacArthur's involvement in the political realm that ultimately fractured the relationship and led to his dismissal. He was not a politician and failed to appreciate that his military policies contradicted the political policies of the Truman Administration. However, MacArthur's involvement in the political realm throughout his career, not just in Korea, that separated him from the professional military ethic and the military mind, making him an "unmilitary" man, and setting him at odds with his president.⁵²

The Korean War and MacArthur's Dismissal

The seminal reason surrounding the relief of MacArthur has often been pinned on his letter to Republican Speaker of the House Joseph W. Martin. The letter, which contradicted White House policy, was read aloud by Congressman Martin on the floor of the House on 5 April 1950.⁵³ This event is not the only justification for MacArthur's dismissal; it is simply the final act in a struggle between President Truman and General MacArthur. Additional reasons included repeated violations of a "gag order" placed on his command and other government agencies. He publicly contradicted White House policy regarding Formosa, preceding the Korean War.⁵⁴ Dr.

⁵² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 369.

⁵³ Dennis Wainstock, *Truman MacArthur and the Korean War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 122-126.

⁵⁴ Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 79-82. Alan R. Millet, *The War for Korea, 1950-1951 They Came from the North* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2010), 420-423. Michael D. Pearlman, *Truman and MacArthur: The Winding Road to Dismissal* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute US Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 7. Geoffrey Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 555, 567-568. John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1965), 205. Dennis Wainstock, *Truman MacArthur and the Korean War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 101.

Michael Pearlman provides a useful framework to approach the dismissal of the Commander in Chief Far East (CINCFE). He proposed that the sequence of events happened in three stages. The first stage began with the onset of the conflict and ended with the Inchon landing in September 1950. This stage “was one of implicit bargaining and compromise.” The second stage lasted until China’s military intervention at the end of November and “was one of de facto abdication by the President.” Truman was willing to forgive MacArthur, in light of his recent successes, and let him bring the conflict to a successful military conclusion. The Chinese ability to drive United Nations forces back to the Yalu River marked the beginning of the final stage characterized by Truman “shifting operational authority for the war to the commander of the Eighth Army and the JCS.”⁵⁵

President Truman’s pre-existing disdain for MacArthur only fueled his decision to relieve him.⁵⁶ President Truman believed that the president and senior military leaders must maintain a certain amount of loyalty to one another. MacArthur’s letter to Congressman Martin shifted Truman’s interpretation of his senior military commander. He no longer viewed MacArthur as a military leader, but as a political enemy. This redefinition of MacArthur gave Truman the impetus to remove MacArthur from active military service; something he believed he should have done before the Korean War.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Michael D. Pearlman, *Truman and MacArthur: The Winding Road to Dismissal* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute US Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 2.

⁵⁶ Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 77-82. Alan R. Millet, *The War for Korea, 1950-1951 They Came from the North* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2010), 54. Michael D. Pearlman, *Truman and MacArthur: The Winding Road to Dismissal* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute US Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 2. Geoffrey Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 472, 498, 531.

⁵⁷ Dale R. Hersspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 81. Michael D. Pearlman, *Truman and MacArthur: The Winding Road to Dismissal* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute US Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 2-3. Geoffrey Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 473. John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1965), 272-273.

The discussion of President Truman and General MacArthur's relationship during the Korean War identifies the difficulties that arose between them and led to the eventual dismissal of General MacArthur. To understand the root of these problems and their significance, it is essential to review the background of these two men. This examination will point out the differences and some similarities of their backgrounds, providing a better appreciation to the reader of the difficulties these two men were unable to overcome and contributed to the failure of the civil-military relationship.

Presidential Background

Harry S. Truman was born on 8 May 1884 in Lamar, Missouri. His father, John Truman farmed and traded livestock, which failed to provide enough to support the family, so shortly after his birth, John moved the family to Harrisonville, Missouri. The farm in Harrisonville also proved to be a disappointment and with a growing family, and they moved to his maternal grandfather's farm in Independence, Missouri.⁵⁸ Both of President Truman's grandfathers served in the Confederate Army and the atmosphere of Independence, located in a state sharply divided over the Civil War, was decidedly pro-Confederacy. Views about minorities and the sense of tradition and morality all took on a southern flavor, in a state whose loyalties were split between support for the Confederacy and support for the Union.⁵⁹

President Truman required glasses when he turned five due to farsightedness and this, coupled with his not being a "fighter," worried Harry that others would view him as a "sissy." This view seems to be largely self-critical "to judge by the recollections of several boyhood

⁵⁸ Robert H. Ferrel, *The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman* (Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2002), 1-8. Robert H. Ferrel, *Harry S. Truman* (Washington: CQ Press, 2003), 7-8. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 37.

⁵⁹ David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 32, 53. Ralph E. Weber, *Talking with Harry: Candid Conversations with President Harry S. Truman* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2001), 226.

friends he wasn't considered a sissy exactly, only different, 'serious'." Young Truman was an intelligent young boy and skipped the third grade. He excelled in history and became an accomplished piano player as well.⁶⁰ In addition to the influences of his teachers, he learned many of the values that became the foundation of his character while attending Sunday school at the Presbyterian Church, echoed at home by his parents as well. They would say, "Keep your word. Never get too big for your britches. Never forget a friend." The first indication of Truman's political leanings came in the summer of 1900, when he and his father attended the Democratic National Convention in Kansas City.⁶¹

Harry Truman had aspirations of attending West Point following his high school graduation, but his poor eyesight kept him out of the academy. That same year his father lost his entire fortune in a series of unsuccessful investments that forced him to move the family to Kansas City. Not only would Harry not attend West Point, attending college at all was now out of the question.⁶² Harry would work briefly in the mailroom of the Kansas City Star and the Santa Fe Railroad, before working at the National Bank of Commerce and then the Union National Bank from 1903 to 1905.⁶³ In May 1905, Harry enlisted in the Missouri National Guard joining the new "Missouri's Light Artillery, Battery B, First Brigade." That same year Harry quit his job

⁶⁰ Robert H. Ferrel, (*The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman* (Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2002), 8-9. Robert H. Ferrel, *Harry S. Truman* (Washington: CQ Press, 2003), 8. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 43, 45, 59, 61.

⁶¹ David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 55, 63.

⁶² Robert H. Ferrel, *The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman* (Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2002), 17. Robert H. Ferrel, *Harry S. Truman* (Washington: CQ Press, 2003), 8. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 66-67.

⁶³ Robert H. Ferrel, *The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman* (Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2002), 17-18. Robert H. Ferrel, *Harry S. Truman* (Washington: CQ Press, 2003), 8. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 69, 73.

at the bank and returned to Independence to help his father run his Grandfather's Blue Ridge Farm.⁶⁴

He continued his work on the farm, becoming a full partner in 1911. Following the death of his father in 1914 and his Uncle Harrison 1916, he became the sole owner before departing in 1917 for WWI. During his time on the Blue Ridge farm, he began to court his childhood friend Elizabeth "Bessie" Wallace. Individual correspondence between Harry and Bessie provide indications of his character and driving factors for some of his later decisions, in particular his dislike of "snobs" and "hypocrisy in any form."⁶⁵

President Truman's military service began with a three-year enlistment in the Missouri National Guard as a private in the artillery beginning in 1905. He signed on again in 1908 for another three years before leaving the National Guard in 1911. Unit leaders held Truman in high regard during this time where he served mainly as the battery clerk. Although no longer in the National Guard, he maintained ties and friendships with many of those with whom he served. This proved beneficial when he attempted to rejoin his old unit in 1917 at the age of thirty-three, past the age limit for enlisted service. Hoping to secure a sergeant's position upon reenlisting, fellow Guardsmen voted Truman to the rank of First Lieutenant and took over a platoon in F Battery. Following train-up at Fort Sill, his unit departed for France in March 1918. While serving in France, Lieutenant Truman received a promotion to Captain and took command of D Battery. This Battery had discipline problems and Truman began the task of getting the Battery back into shape. Captain Truman performed honorably in combat through the cessation of hostilities in November 1918. Truman returned to the United States with a recommendation for

⁶⁴ Robert H. Ferrel, *The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman* (Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2002), 27. Robert H. Ferrel, *Harry S. Truman* (Washington: CQ Press, 2003), 8-9. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 72-73.

⁶⁵ David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 80, 86, 95, 101, 86.

promotion the rank of Major.⁶⁶ Truman remained active in the National Guard, commanding two artillery regiments as a Colonel and attending classes at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. His service in the National Guard gave him the opportunity to become familiar with many of the generals that eventually commanded in World War II. He would later write that if, “fate had played out differently, he might have ended his career as a two-star general in the Regular Army.”⁶⁷

After WWI, Truman returned home, married Bessie Wallace, and briefly owned a haberdashery in the Kansas City area. However, the business went bankrupt during the financial crisis of 1921, encouraging him to begin his political career, first serving as a judge in Jackson County, Missouri in 1922. He held positions in the Jackson County court system until 1934, when he won the United States Senate race for Missouri and began his national-level political career. Truman’s service in the Senate between the years 1935 and 1940 lacked notable achievements. In 1941, he announced his plans to form a committee to investigate government waste in defense spending. The official title was the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program; everyone came to refer to it as the Truman Committee. This committee and the subsequent savings that it provided to the United States government restored the public’s trust and put Truman in the national spotlight. This national recognition eventually led to his consideration for the Vice Presidency in the 1944 election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Robert H. Ferrel, *The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman* (Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2002), 27-28, 41, 45-46. Robert H. Ferrel, *Harry S. Truman* (Washington: CQ Press, 2003), 9. D.M. Giangreco, *The Soldier from Independence* (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009), 17-24, 75, 92, 257. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 104-105.

⁶⁷ D.M. Giangreco, *The Soldier from Independence* (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009), XII

⁶⁸ Robert H. Ferrel, *The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman* (Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2002), 55-57, 75-78, 89-93. Robert H. Ferrel, *Harry S. Truman* (Washington: CQ Press, 2003), 10, 15-18. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 151, 166, 212, 257, 259, 288. Geoffrey Perret, *Commander in Chief* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2007), 16-17.

Following Roosevelt's death in April 1945, Truman took the oath as the Thirty-Third President of the United States. He retained Roosevelt's cabinet, but clearly stated that while he welcomed and respected their advice, he ultimately made the decisions. He expected "their support once decisions were made."⁶⁹ During his tenure as president, he developed the Truman Doctrine, a foreign policy that sought to contain the spread of communism.⁷⁰ He also oversaw the desegregation of the military in 1948. He was conservative and sometimes referred to as "folksy," but it was also clear that he held himself responsible for the actions of the Office of the President. As he would famously declare, "the buck stops here."

Huntington's patterns of civil-military relations again prove useful analyzing how President Truman's background influenced his relationship with the military and General MacArthur. The first is the variable of political ideology. The Democratic politics of the Kansas City area and his own father's support of these democratic politicians influenced his decisions regarding political party affiliation. The liberal ideology inherent in the political party also benefitted from the strong leadership of President Franklin Roosevelt. However, instead of pursuing the purely anti-military ideology that Huntington defines as liberalism, President Truman took a different course in his approach. His military experience combined with the recent successes of the US military in WWII influenced him to take a combined approach. While his domestic policies would continue in the liberal tradition of President Roosevelt, his approach to foreign policy took a pro-military or conservative approach. President Truman also accepted the

⁶⁹ Robert H. Ferrel, *The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman* (Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2002), 100. Robert H. Ferrel, *Harry S. Truman* (Washington: CQ Press, 2003), 18. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 347-348. Geoffrey Perret, *Commander in Chief* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2007), 18.

⁷⁰ John G. Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Tony Smith, *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 20. Howard Jones, *Crucible of Power* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2008), 254-257. Ralph Weber, *Talking with Harry: Candid Conversations with President Harry S. Truman* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2001), 66-72.

military to possess a high level of political power, Huntington's second variable in the civil-military pattern. This acceptance is a result of his previous military experience and may be the result of his education. Lacking the college experience may have prevented his exposure to the more liberal aspects of the Democratic Party, with his experience rooted in the bare knuckles environment of Kansas City politics of the 1920s and 30s vice the more refined introduction and educational experience of President Wilson. Regarding the third variable, President Truman expected a high level of military professionalism. This expectation proved to be great motivation for President Truman in his decision to dismiss General MacArthur. When President Truman ceased to view General MacArthur as a military commander and instead a political rival, the decision for his dismissal was easy for him to make.

MacArthur's Background

General Douglas MacArthur was born on 26 January 1880 at Little Rock Barracks, Arkansas. The young Douglas spent the majority of his formative years at different frontier Army posts. Completely immersed in military life from birth, he would say that his earliest memory was "the sound of bugles." Douglas' father, Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur Jr., began his career as a Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry Officer in the Union Army during the Civil War. Following the war, while Douglas lived at home, Arthur served on the American frontier, at Fort Leavenworth, in Washington, District of Columbia (D.C.), and at Fort Sam Houston. While serving in Washington, D.C., Arthur gathered the necessary witness statements and recommended himself for the Medal of Honor for his actions at Missionary Ridge, during the Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. "A board of officers was convened" and the award approved.⁷¹

⁷¹ Richard B. Frank, *MacArthur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 3, 4. Clark Lee and Richard Henschell, *Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), 9, 15. William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,

Douglas MacArthur later attempted to recommend himself for the Medal of Honor with no success.⁷²

The assignment to Washington, D.C. was Douglas' first exposure to formal education and his grades indicate that he was merely an average student. His father's assignment to Fort Sam Houston resulted in attendance to the West Texas Military Academy (WTMA). He enrolled in the ninth grade and began his drive toward academic excellence that continued throughout the remainder of his academic career.⁷³ Douglas MacArthur applied for an at-large appointment to the United States Military Academy (USMA) during his junior year at WTMA. President Cleveland denied him and it is suspected that his family's recent change of political affiliation to the Republican Party may have influenced the president's decision. MacArthur applied a second time to Cleveland's successor, following his graduation from WTMA in 1897, but was again unsuccessful. He succeeded on third attempt at admission, and at the age of twenty, MacArthur began his military career at West Point in 1899.⁷⁴

MacArthur graduated at the top his class in 1903 and as West Point tradition dictated, he received a commission as an Engineer officer. His first assignment was to the Philippines, but left after a year in 1904 after contracting Malaria. He briefly served with the California Debris

1978), 39. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 3, 20.

⁷² Richard B. Frank, *MacArthur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 6. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 69-71.

⁷³ Richard B. Frank, *MacArthur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 4. Clark Lee and Richard Henschell, *Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), 16. William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 28, 44-45. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 20-21.

⁷⁴ Richard B. Frank, *MacArthur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 4-5. Clark Lee and Richard Henschell, *Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), 27-29. William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 45-48, 54-55, 64. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 23, 26.

Commission before his assignment to Tokyo as his father's aide-de-camp. In 1908, MacArthur received his first command; Company K, 3rd Engineer Battalion at Fort Leavenworth, and later served as the Battalion's adjutant.⁷⁵

On September 5, 1912, his father collapsed and died of a stroke while addressing a military reunion. His mother, already sick at the time, sought treatment at Johns Hopkins and Captain MacArthur received assignment to the War Department in Washington D.C. under Army Chief of Staff Major General Leonard Wood.⁷⁶ Shortly after arriving, the threat of war began to brew between the United States and Mexico and Major General Wood stepped down as the Chief of Staff to command the field army organized for action against Mexico. Assigned to the General Staff, MacArthur conducted a reconnaissance of Veracruz. During this assignment, he made his first self-recommendation for the Medal of Honor. Following his service in Mexico, MacArthur returned to Washington and the General Staff as a Major. While still a member of the General Staff, MacArthur provided recommendations on the organization of National Guard units for deployment to France. His recommendations led to the formation of the 42nd Infantry Division. Newly promoted Colonel MacArthur, now an Infantry Officer served as the division's chief of staff. By the end of WWI, MacArthur commanded the 42nd Infantry Division and received a

⁷⁵ Richard B. Frank, *MacArthur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 5. William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 66. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 52. Richard Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The General and The President and The Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), 26.

⁷⁶ Clark Lee and Richard Henschell, *Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), 24. William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 38. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 64-65. Richard Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The General and The President and The Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), 25.

recommendation for promotion to major general. General Pershing denied MacArthur's second self-recommendation for the Medal of Honor, for his actions during WWI.⁷⁷

Following WWI, Brigadier General MacArthur served as the superintendent of West Point. The second youngest superintendent in West Point history, he instituted controversial changes during his two-year tenure. Although controversial, his changes paved the way for future reforms at the academy. The superintendent post at USMA was normally a four-year assignment. However, MacArthur met and married Louise Cromwell Brooks. Ms. Brooks was the former mistress of General Pershing and before meeting MacArthur, she was engaged to Pershing's aid. Despite denials by General Pershing, it is likely that MacArthur's early departure from West Point and reassignment to the Philippines in 1922 was the direct result of Pershing's disapproval of the relationship.⁷⁸

MacArthur made three trips to the Philippines during the 1920s. Upon his initial arrival in 1922, there was not a billet for a brigadier general, putting MacArthur in charge of the largely nonexistent Military District of Manila. After a brief return to the United States to visit his ailing mother, MacArthur returned to serve as a brigade commander in the newly organized Philippine

⁷⁷ Richard B. Frank, *MacArthur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 5-11. Clark Lee and Richard Henschell, *Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), 32-38. William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 73-79, 81-96, 109-110. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 69-71, 77-78, 110. Richard Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The General and The President and The Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), 26-27.

⁷⁸ Richard B. Frank, *MacArthur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 12-14. Clark Lee and Richard Henschell, *Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), 39, 48-49. William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 116-129. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 117-118, 127. Richard Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The General and The President and The Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), 27-28.

Division until his promotion in January 1925 to Major General. At age forty-four, MacArthur was also the youngest Major General in the Army.⁷⁹

MacArthur briefly commanded IV Corps, headquartered in Atlanta, before requesting a transfer. The people of Atlanta did not hide their displeasure in the fact that his father was a Union Officer involved in the Atlanta Campaign during the Civil War and they did not welcome him or his bride. With his request approved, MacArthur departed for Baltimore and assumed command of III Corps.⁸⁰ Shortly thereafter, MacArthur served on the Court Martial Board against Brigadier General Billy Mitchell. MacArthur never publicly commented on the case, but some believe that MacArthur cast the only not guilty vote among the board members. True or not, statements made later by MacArthur infer his belief that Mitchell was entitled by virtue of his rank, position and expertise, to publically disagree with the civilian leadership.⁸¹

With the coming retirement of General Summerall in the fall of 1930, The Secretary of War considered General MacArthur to serve as the next Chief of Staff of the Army. With the backing of the Secretary of War Patrick Hurley, President Hoover appointed MacArthur as the

⁷⁹ Richard B. Frank, *MacArthur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 14-15. Clark Lee and Richard Henschell, *Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), 50. William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 129-135. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 130-134. Richard Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The General and The President and The Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), 27-28.

⁸⁰ Richard B. Frank, *MacArthur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 15. Clark Lee and Richard Henschell, *Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), 43. William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 135. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 135.

⁸¹ Richard B. Frank, *MacArthur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 15. Clark Lee and Richard Henschell, *Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), 43-46. Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences of the General of the Army Douglas MacArthur* (Annapolis: Blue Jacket Books, 1964), 71. William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 136-137. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 136-137. Richard Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The General and The President and The Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), 28-31.

Eighth Chief of Staff of the Army.⁸² MacArthur's ongoing battle with Congress and Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt about insufficient funding of the military and his controversial actions against the Bonus Expeditionary Force (BEF) protesters came to define his tenure as the Chief of Staff, from November 1930 until October 1935.⁸³ The nature of these disagreements displayed MacArthur's willingness to address the public directly, without approval of civilian authority.⁸⁴ The events surrounding the eviction of BEF protesters are also interesting to consider. In July 1932, after the police were unable to quell the riots in Washington D.C., President Hoover directed MacArthur to use military force to remove the protesters. MacArthur obeyed and pushed the protestors across the Anacostia River, where the main BEF encampment was located. President Hoover then issued orders that the military would not cross the river and would not engage the encampment. MacArthur knowingly disobeyed the orders of the Commander in Chief, as he crossed the river and cleared the encampment. MacArthur avoided condemnation for this action by holding a press conference shortly afterward, praising the president for his decision and swift action in preventing a larger confrontation. This did not escape the attention of future President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who later realized that he would have to leverage MacArthur's

⁸² William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 144. Geoffrey Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 143.

⁸³ William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 150, 152-153. Geoffrey Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 145, 150, 156. Richard Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger Jr., *The General and The President and The Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), 31.

⁸⁴ William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 148.

abilities as an Army Officer while at the same time retarding his abilities to affect political decisions.⁸⁵

Following his service as the Army Chief of Staff, MacArthur became the senior American military advisor to the Philippine Government. MacArthur accepted this position only after his political maneuvering to become the High Commissioner of the Philippines was unsuccessful. The High Commissioner position was politically prestigious and could possibly provide a platform for future political advancement.⁸⁶ MacArthur retired from active military service on 31 December 1937 remaining in the Philippines as a military adviser and Field Marshall, a title given to him by Philippine President Quezon in August of 1936.⁸⁷

President Roosevelt recalled Major General MacArthur to active service on 26 July 1941 with the federalization of Philippine troops. He assumed command of the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) and regained his former rank of general on 20 December 1941.⁸⁸ MacArthur was unable to stave off the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and declared Manila an open city on 24 December 1941. The following day, MacArthur moved his headquarters to Corregidor. General MacArthur, his family, and his staff evacuated on the night of 12 March 1942 to Australia. For his actions in the defense of the Philippines, MacArthur

⁸⁵ William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978, 152), Geoffrey Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 160-161.

⁸⁶ William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 161-162.

⁸⁷ William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 172, 180. Richard Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *The General and The President and The Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), 42.

⁸⁸ Richard B. Frank, *MacArthur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 40, 46. Clark Lee and Richard Henschell, *Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), 122. William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 190.

finally received the Medal of Honor.⁸⁹ He and his father were the first father and son to receive the medal. MacArthur became General of the Army in December of 1944 and in anticipation of the attack on mainland Japan, commanded the newly formed United States Army Forces Pacific. The surrender of the Japanese, following the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, precluded the need for the invasion and General MacArthur accepted the formal Japanese surrender from the deck of the USS Missouri on 2 September 1945. Following the cessation of hostilities, MacArthur became the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) headquartered in Tokyo. In this capacity, MacArthur oversaw the reconstruction of Japan, the development of its new constitution, and the revitalization of its industrial and economic base.⁹⁰

The influence that General MacArthur's background had upon him becomes more discernible when seen through Huntington's patterns of civil-military relations. His political ideology was pro-military, if only by default because of his position as a military officer and reinforced by the fact that his father also supported the Republican Party. He spent his early life and military career trying to live up to his father's example, even in the pursuit and self-recommendations for the Medal of Honor. This pursuit led to a high level of military professionalism. Later in his career, he began to explore the political power possible through his military service. His involvement in politics began with his service as the superintendent of West Point and continued during his time working on the Army staff. His most significant exposure began with his tenure as the Army Chief of Staff and his actions in WWII only served to reinforce

⁸⁹ Richard B. Frank, *MacArthur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 50-52. Clark Lee and Richard Henschell, *Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), 156-159. William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 278. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 259, 276.

⁹⁰ Richard B. Frank, *MacArthur* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 120-121, 128. William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 438-439. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 473. Richard Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger Jr., *The General and The President and The Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), 87.

his political exposure. Huntington argues that this marks a departure from being a military man and threatens MacArthur's military professionalism. This degradation of military professionalism was not indicative of the senior officer corps at the time of his dismissal, but it does reinforce President Truman's changing view of MacArthur from that of a military commander to that of a political rival.

Conclusion

The removal of such a highly decorated and widely respected officer would infer that the relationship between President Truman and General MacArthur was problematic, at best. Their relationship illustrates Huntington's coordinated type and is due to MacArthur's access to President Truman and his involvement in the political arena. The Secretary of Defense was not a catalyst in the breakdown of the civil-military relationship

Throughout his career, General MacArthur displayed a willingness to project his opinions to the public, in some instances with the intent to sway the outcome regarding both domestic and foreign policy. His statements following operations to clear out BEF, while serving as the Army Chief of Staff, provides direct evidence of his efforts to influence public policy. His statements preceding the Korean War regarding White House policy on Formosa, is yet another example, this time pertaining to foreign policy. His time serving in the Philippines as the senior military advisor to that country before World War II and his service as the SCAP commander in Japan brought him both national and international recognition. Because General MacArthur had both the willingness and the experience to make political decisions, it seems only understandable that his relationship with the president would drift toward a coordinated type.

President Truman had to contend with a strong personality in his senior military commander. In dealing with that situation, it was imperative that he create a buffer between himself and General MacArthur. Clearly establishing the separation between civil-military authorities, as was successfully executed by President Wilson, allows the Commander-in-Chief to

focus on the larger foreign relations tasks. Dividing his time between his commander in chief and his presidential responsibilities reduced President Truman's effectiveness in supervising the military and diplomatic efforts.

Historians have described the struggle to maintain this civil-military relationship and its subsequent failure as having taken place in three distinct phases. Initially, MacArthur's access to the president put Truman in the position of bargaining with the general. The second phase, in which President Truman chose to overlook General MacArthur's past transgressions, only delayed the eventual outcome by not addressing the flaws in the relationship. President Truman may have anticipated that the General MacArthur could win the war before the problems had to be addressed again. The final phase, brought on by the unforeseen involvement of the Chinese, left President Truman with no choice but to finally address a relationship that was too far gone to salvage.⁹¹

President Truman did possess some military experience and even made a point of heralding this experience when campaigning for the Presidency. However, this military experience was with the National Guard and his advancement before WWI had as much to do with his popularity and political abilities as they did with his military proficiency. His military service provided the possibility for common understanding between himself and MacArthur; however, his preconceived notions of MacArthur and his own ego served to prevent this bond from ever existing.

Military service notwithstanding, President Truman and General MacArthur had very little else in common. As with President Wilson and General Pershing, the first illustration of divergence lies with their families and upbringing. This division began with the most divisive

⁹¹ Michael D. Pearlman, *Truman and MacArthur: The Winding Road to Dismissal* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute US Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), 2.

event in United States history, the Civil War. President Truman's family background of strong Confederate support and service lies in direct contrast to that of the MacArthur's. These conditions would display themselves in future events such as President Truman's reluctance to integrate the Armed Forces and the discrimination that MacArthur experienced during his brief Corps command time stationed in Atlanta. Even further divergence is evident in the personal or civilian lives led by these men. While Truman was a farmer, small business owner, and local politician, MacArthur never experienced civilian life. Finally, the two men were vastly different in their level of education. Truman is the last sitting United States President to lack a college education, while MacArthur's education benefitted from one of the premier college educations in the country, USMA. MacArthur also held additional advanced education through the United States Army Professional Education system.

One area, beyond their affinity for the military, in which both shared similar experience, was the political realm. While Truman occupied the prestigious office of President of the United States, his participation in national politics at the time of MacArthur's dismissal totaled a mere sixteen years. By comparison, MacArthur began his formal involvement in national politics upon his appointment as the Chief of Staff of the Army under the Hoover administration, five years before Truman's election to the United States Senate. His direct involvement with officers, such as Pershing, offered him indirect experience with national politics as well. While not an elected official, MacArthur explored the potential political influence of his rank as early as his involvement in quelling the "bonus army" riots in 1932.⁹² This apparent equity of political experience does not excuse MacArthur's actions in showing less than due respect for civilian control of the military, but it may offer some explanation.

⁹² William Manchester, *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 150, 152-153. Geoffery Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die. The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 1996), 160-161.

In examining the whole man, it appears the two had very little on which to base a personal relationship. Their personal upbringing and formative experiences, outside of their mutual involvement in WWI, draw little commonality. The military experience should provide a basis for common understanding, but in the end did little to bridge the gap. MacArthur had a great deal in the way of experience with national politics, perhaps even more than President Truman did. MacArthur also enjoyed the popular support of the United States citizenry.⁹³ However, his undoing was his inability to understand the American civil-military relationship. Exceptional military experience, popular support, and understanding of national politics and foreign policy do not provide an excuse for a United States military leader from civilian subordination.

Huntington states that while a balanced type is the most effective type of civil-military relationship, the nature of American politics usually defaults to either the coordinated or the vertical type.⁹⁴ However, the failure of this relationship was not solely the result of its nature as a coordinated type. Instead, the correlation between the relationship type and the pattern of the relationship variables also contributed to this failure. As stated previously in this case study, the pattern reflected a high level of military political power. A pro-military ideology, a low level of political power and a high level of military professionalism characterize Huntington's fifth pattern of civil-military relations. This is the same as the one encountered between President Truman and General MacArthur, with the exception that it displayed a low level of military political power. Utilization of Huntington's fifth pattern would yield a different and perhaps more effective outcome, in fact, this pattern that defined the relationship between President Truman and General Ridgeway, following the dismissal of General MacArthur.

⁹³ Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 35.

⁹⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 188.

President Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara and General William Westmoreland

Mistrust and aversion best describes the relationship between President Johnson and his top military commanders. Johnson had no faith in their abilities and until the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approached him collectively, he rarely called on them for advice. He and his core of civilian advisors often made military decisions in their absence using his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, to buffer his association with them. Lyndon Johnson's relationship was more cordial with the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General William Westmoreland. However, this seems to be because President Johnson viewed Westmoreland, whom he had personally chosen to command forces in Vietnam, as representing his policies there. In short, removal or criticism of Westmoreland would reflect negatively on his own decisions. General Westmoreland relinquished command of forces in Vietnam shortly after the Tet offensive of 1967 to become the next Chief of Staff of the Army.⁹⁵

President Johnson's background reinforces his liberal and ant-military political ideology. Unlike President Truman, whose military experience helped in maintaining a pro-military approach to foreign policy, President Johnson was committed to the liberal approach on both fronts. More in keeping with President Wilson, President Johnson's motivation for military involvement focused on a higher cause in the containment of communism and the spread of democracy in Southeast Asia. President Johnson displayed the individualism that typifies the liberal ideology from an early age and this ideology profited from President Roosevelt's leadership of the Democratic Party during much of his political career before the presidency. While his military service brought the expectation of a high level of military professionalism, his

⁹⁵ Charles A. Stevenson, *Warriors and Politicians* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 152, 158-159. Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 171-172. Lewis Sorley, *A Better War* (Orlando: Harcourt, 1999), 15-16.

administration's approach marginalized military leaders; no matter the extent they were willing to marginalize their military political power. These views reinforced his approach to the type of civil-military relationship as well. The vertical type allowed President Johnson to insulate himself from the direct management of the armed forces and concentrate on his liberal domestic agenda.

McNamara accepted President Kennedy's offer for the position as Secretary of Defense, only after expressing his belief that he was not qualified for the position. Kennedy allayed his apprehension stating that he also believed there was nothing to prepare one to become the President of the United States. As part of his acceptance, McNamara insisted on absolute control over the Department of Defense to include choosing his subordinates. This is characteristic of McNamara, who worked to concentrate power and decision making authority at the senior levels at Ford.⁹⁶ The exclusion of the JCS and the absolute control sought by McNamara over military decision-making reflects his past behavior.⁹⁷

In early January 1964, Army Chief of Staff General Wheeler informed Westmoreland that he would proceed to Vietnam to assume duties as the deputy commander of the Military Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV) under General Harkins. President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara chose Westmoreland over three other candidates, including West Point classmates, Abrams and Palmer. President Johnson impressed by General Westmoreland's experience, also felt at ease by the presence of his southern accent and saw in Westmoreland a person he could trust. Although it was widely accepted that General Westmoreland would soon take over as the commander, official announcement did not come until April of 1964. He assumed command of MACV following General Harkins' retirement on 1 August. Westmoreland

⁹⁶ Deborah Shapely, *Promise and Power* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 67, 83-86. Charles A. Stevenson, *Warriors and Politicians* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 152.

⁹⁷ Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 173. Charles A. Stevenson, *Warriors and Politicians* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 156, 158-159.

spent the first five months as deputy in Vietnam travelling the area of operations and assessing the situation. In June, he presented his new strategy for Vietnam to Secretary of Defense McNamara at meeting in Honolulu. The new strategy, called *hop tac*, called for United States forces to secure major populations centers, clearing it of enemy influence, and then spreading out from those centers to secure the remainder of the country. The Secretary of Defense approved the plan and less than two months later Westmoreland took command of MACV.⁹⁸

The relationship between President Johnson and General Westmoreland is the middle road of the three cases; however, it is the most complex, requiring a review of the Secretary of Defense McNamara, in addition to the president and the military commander. Huntington's final type of executive civil-military relationship, the vertical type, defines this relationship. The situation illustrates the vertical type in that it places the Secretary of Defense in a role described as assistant commander or deputy commander in chief.⁹⁹ The political ideology of the Johnson administration, both domestically and in foreign policies was liberal. The application of military force, while arguably manipulated for political advantage, was used to promote the higher of ideals of checking communist aggression and to ensure freedom and democracy for the citizens of South Vietnam. This anti-military political ideology offers the first element of Huntington's pattern of civil-military relations. The remaining two elements are the low level of political military power and a high level of military professionalism. This is the second pattern of civil-military relations that Huntington defines and he states that in this pattern, "the ideology of

⁹⁸ William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1989), 82-83. Ernest B. Furgurson, *Westmoreland: The Inevitable General* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 286, 297-299. Lewis Sorley, *A Better War* (New York: Harcourt, 1999), 1.

⁹⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 188.

society is so intensely pursued that it is impossible for the military to escape its influence no matter how far they reduce their political power.”¹⁰⁰

The Vietnam War and the Civil-Military Relationship

Westmoreland’s plan for securing South Vietnam focused resources on the training of South Vietnamese Armed Forces (ARVN). The president’s senior military advisor and soon to be United States Ambassador to Vietnam, retired General Maxwell Taylor, supported this plan. This approach would change over the course of the following year, changes resulting from an accumulation of events, but most notably marked by the events surrounding naval engagements in the Gulf of Tonkin and the subsequent congressional resolution that resulted in August 1964.¹⁰¹ The resolution gave unprecedented powers to the president to commit combat forces and military actions to and in Vietnam. This, coupled with President Johnson’s re-election, opened the door for his increased involvement in Vietnam, changing the course of the war over the next four years. The focus for operations in Vietnam now centered on the elimination of enemy forces and became Westmoreland’s attrition based approach.¹⁰² The change of course by the Johnson administration attempted to achieve short-term political gains that would divert attention away from Vietnam and allow the president to focus on what was most important to him: domestic policy.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 96-97.

¹⁰¹ Louis Fisher, *Presidential War Power* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 129-132. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 112, 135-136.

¹⁰² Louis Fisher, *Presidential War Power* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 133-134. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 108.

¹⁰³ H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 117, 243-244.

This approach contradicted the opinions among some of Westmoreland's peers, including the three generals dismissed in favor of General Westmoreland, most notably General Creighton Abrams. As Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Abrams was in the approval chain for the study titled "A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam" (PROVN). This new study, completed in early 1967, recommended focus on the provincial levels of government and below, utilizing small unit tactics. Work done by McNamara's own System's Analysis office reinforced the findings of this study. PROVN and the System's Analysis Office also reinforced the changing opinions of McNamara, who was now convinced that United States strategy in Vietnam should change.¹⁰⁴

To effect this change in strategy, the White House designated Lieutenant General Abrams to take over as the deputy commander of MACV in May 1967, with expectations that he would assume command of MACV shortly thereafter. More than a year passed, however, before the change of command took place. This resulted from a public disagreement between McNamara and Westmoreland over troop levels. The president responded by expressing support for Westmoreland and again delayed the change of command due to the Tet offensive. President Johnson's effort to deflect blame from himself, having been the one who selected General Westmoreland, possibly had as much to do with his decision as his loyalty to him. In April 1968, the White House announced General Westmoreland would as the next Army Chief of Staff.¹⁰⁵

The discussion of the relationship between President Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Westmoreland during the Vietnam War identifies the difficulties that arose between them and led to the removal of General Westmoreland. To understand the root of these problems and to understand perhaps why General Westmoreland received a promotion

¹⁰⁴ Lewis Sorley, *A Better War* (New York: Harcourt, 1999), 5-8.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 6-7, 15-16.

instead of a forced retirement, it is essential to review the background of these three men. This examination will point out the differences of these three men regarding their political ideologies and their similarities, in particular President Johnson and General Westmorland's similar southern upbringing.

Presidential Background

Lyndon Baines Johnson was born August 27, 1908 in Stonewall, Texas, while his father, Sam Ealy Johnson, was serving in the Texas State Legislature. His mother Rebekah was a journalist in Austin before marrying Sam Johnson in 1907. While reporting on the state legislature she met and interviewed Sam Johnson and the two were married a short time later. Lyndon Johnson was the oldest and favorite child in a family that eventually included two boys and three girls.¹⁰⁶

Johnson started his education at an early age. His mother, unable to prevent him from wandering to the nearby schoolhouse during recess, convinced the teacher to enroll him in school, at the age of four. His performance in school was above average, graduating at the top of his class. He participated in the debate club, winning the Blanco County debate competition, and was voted the class president his senior year. Upon graduation from high school, his initial plan did not include college, but his mother influenced him to apply. Johnson had to attend a preparatory school and pass a battery of entrance exams because his high school was not accredited. In 1924, he dropped out of college and ran away with friends to California. The group's plan was to find work in a cement factory; however, he and another boy were unable to secure employment at the factory and had to find work as farm hands. This incident was not the first time that he had run

¹⁰⁶ Clarke Newlon, *L.B.J. The Man from Johnson City* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1964), 25. Randall B. Woods, *LBJ, Architect of American Ambition* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 14-21.

away from home. As a child, he would frequently run away and hide from his parents in an attempt to garner attention.¹⁰⁷ His parents convinced him to return to Texas, but he did not return to college until 1927.¹⁰⁸

Johnson graduated from Southwest Texas State Teachers' College in 1930 and was heavily involved and successful in campus politics during his time there. After graduating, Johnson served briefly as a high school teacher before his opportunity to begin a career in politics presented itself. The newly elected United States Congressman from Texas, Richard Kleberg offered Johnson a job as his executive secretary in Washington D.C. He worked tirelessly to learn the inner workings of politics in Washington. He also married Claudia Alta Taylor, nicknamed Lady Bird, in 1934. He left his position as Kleberg's assistant in 1935 and President Roosevelt appointed him the Texas director of the National Youth Association.¹⁰⁹ He held this position until successfully running for the United States House of Representatives in 1937. Johnson served in the Congress until January of 1949, representing the Texas 10th Congressional District. He left the House of Representatives to serve in the United States Senate after winning the 1948 elections. During his twelve years in the Senate, he served as the Senate majority whip, minority, and eventually the majority leader. Johnson resigned from the Senate after winning both re-election to the senate and election to the vice-presidency in 1960.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Clarke Newlon, *L.B.J. The Man from Johnson City* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1964), 29-30. Randall B. Woods, *LBJ, Architect of American Ambition* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 23, 44-46. Irwin and Debi Unger, *LBJ, A Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1999), 7, 13, 18.

¹⁰⁸ Clarke Newlon, *L.B.J. The Man from Johnson City* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1964), 30-32. Randall B. Woods, *LBJ, Architect of American Ambition* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 50. Irwin and Debi Unger, *LBJ, A Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1999), 19.

¹⁰⁹ Clarke Newlon, *L.B.J. The Man from Johnson City* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1964), 40-43, 53, 57-58. Randall B. Woods, *LBJ, Architect of American Ambition* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 74, 106. Irwin and Debi Unger, *LBJ, A Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1999), 32-35, 49, 53.

¹¹⁰ Clarke Newlon, *L.B.J. The Man from Johnson City* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1964), 68. Randall B. Woods, *LBJ, Architect of American Ambition* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 217, 375. Irwin and Debi Unger, *LBJ, A Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1999), 161, 180.

While serving in the United States House of Representatives, Johnson also served in the United States Navy receiving his commission in the Naval Reserves in 1940. He served as a Lieutenant Commander in the active Navy after the United States entry into World War II until mid-1942, whereupon he resumed his duties in the Senate. Initially assigned to monitor shipping yards stateside, he eventually travelled to the Pacific Theater to observe conditions and report his findings to President D. Roosevelt. During his time in Theater, Lieutenant Commander Johnson received the Silver Star, awarded by General MacArthur. He also lost his first bid to the United States Senate during this time, losing a special election in 1941.¹¹¹

According to some accounts, the John F. Kennedy camp selected Johnson to aid in winning the support of southern Democrats and not from any personal affinity. Whatever the reason, Kennedy won the 1960 presidential election. While serving as the vice president, Johnson oversaw the president's unofficial committee on science and suggested the idea that the United States commit to putting a man on the moon as a response to the successful Soviet manned space flight in 1961. LBJ served as the head of the Presidential Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities and travelled on diplomatic missions to numerous countries, giving him his first significant exposure to foreign affairs.¹¹²

On 22 November 1963, Johnson became the President of the United States, following the assassination of President Kennedy. One of his first actions as president was to urge the passage of the Civil Rights Bill. The focus of Johnson's presidency centered primarily on his domestic agendas, characterized by his efforts on immigration reform, civil rights and the social programs

¹¹¹ Clarke Newlon, *L.B.J. The Man from Johnson City* (New York: Dodd, Meade and Company, 1964), 102. Randall B. Woods, *LBJ, Architect of American Ambition* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 84-104. Irwin and Debi Unger, *LBJ, A Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1999), 104, 108-113.

¹¹² Randall B. Woods, *LBJ, Architect of American Ambition* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 336, 360-365, 380, 382-392.

known as the “Great Society.”¹¹³ However, he remained committed to containing communist aggression and just four days after assuming the presidency, he passed National Security Act Memorandum (NSAM) #273, countering President Kennedy’s intent to reduce the number of United States advisors in Vietnam. He further increased American involvement following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964.¹¹⁴

McNamara’s Background

Robert Strange McNamara was born June 1916 in San Francisco California. His father, Robert James McNamara was Irish Catholic and the first of his family to be born in the United States. His mother, Claranell Strange was a Presbyterian. Robert and Claranell put their religious differences aside and married in 1914. Subsequently, Robert Strange McNamara was raised Protestant. McNamara’s father pressed him from an early age to excel and he graduated from high school with honors and achieved the rank of Eagle Scout.¹¹⁵

Following high school, McNamara attended the University of California at Berkley. He continued to display academic prowess and participated in student leadership activities and organizations. He graduated with a degree in economics and while his desire to obtain a Rhodes Scholarship did not come to fruition, he did continue his education at the Harvard Business School, earning a Masters in economics. Just before his oral examinations at Harvard, McNamara learned that his father had passed away, following his graduation he went to work at the Price

¹¹³ Mitchell B. Lerner, *Looking Back at LBJ* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 15. Irwin and Debi Unger, *LBJ, A Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1999), 470, 486. Randall B. Woods, *LBJ, Architect of American Ambition* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 462-467.

¹¹⁴ Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 161. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 49. Randall B. Woods, *LBJ, Architect of American Ambition* (New York: Free Press, 2006) 505-506.

¹¹⁵ Deborah Shapely, *Promise and Power* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 5-6, 10-11, 14.

Waterhouse accounting firm. The position at this firm, located in his hometown of San Francisco, was necessitated by the fact that he was now the breadwinner for his family.¹¹⁶

While working at this firm McNamara married Margaret Craig and that same month, after just one year at Price Waterhouse, took a teaching position at Harvard. While a Harvard he went against faculty opinion by voicing his support, albeit anonymously, for FDR against the Republican challenger in the upcoming 1942 Presidential elections. This anonymous support came in the form of a straw poll held by the faculty, and while McNamara never admitted it, historians believe that his was one of just three votes cast in Franklin D. Roosevelt's favor. This support for FDR coupled with LBJ's admiration for the former President may be one of the reasons that McNamara retained his position as Secretary of Defense in the Johnson administration.¹¹⁷

McNamara left Harvard in the spring of 1942 to work for the United States Army Air Force (USAAF). His task was to analyze inefficiencies across many facets of the USAAF including manufacturing and application of the strategic bombing campaign in Europe. He received a commission as a Captain in March of 1943 and achieved the rank of Colonel by the end of the war. His experience with the USAAF led to a position at the Ford Motor Company following his military service.¹¹⁸

McNamara's work at the Ford Motor Company continued along similar lines as that of his service to the USAAF and his ability to increase efficiencies and profits resulted in a rise to the top leadership role at Ford. In November of 1960, after just fourteen years at Ford, Henry

¹¹⁶ Deborah Shapely, *Promise and Power* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 18, 25.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 26-27.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 29-38.

Ford announced McNamara as its next president. McNamara only held this position for a month before accepting the role as the Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy administration.¹¹⁹

Westmoreland's Background

William Childs Westmoreland was born in the small town of Saxon, just three miles from Spartanburg, South Carolina on 26 March 1914. His family was upper middle class, his father was a cotton mill official at the time. Although his father was a Presbyterian, young Westmoreland was baptized and raised Episcopalian like his mother Eugenia. Shortly after he was born, the family moved to Victor Park, about 12 miles outside of Spartanburg, South Carolina after his father took a position with Pacolet Mills.¹²⁰

As a boy, Westmoreland lived in a segregated society and he had very little contact with the African American residents of the surrounding area. This seemed to have little effect in his later life as evidenced by his actions as First Captain at West Point years later. In that event, Westmoreland briefed his men before a visit by the cadets to Savannah, Georgia. A black cadet, Benjamin O. Davis Jr., attending with them was to be the first graduate of West Point and a delegation of African American residents were to meet the cadet when he arrived. There were no incidents.¹²¹ As a young boy, Westmoreland enjoyed the outdoors and his involvement with the Boy Scouts. He achieved the rank of Eagle Scout in 1929. Westmoreland's father aspired for him to be a lawyer and looked for him to attend the Citadel as he had done, with eventual attendance

¹¹⁹ Deborah Shapely, *Promise and Power* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 71, 77.

¹²⁰ William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1989), 9-10. Ernest B. Furgurson, *Westmoreland: The Inevitable General* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 35.

¹²¹ Ernest B. Furgurson, *Westmoreland: The Inevitable General* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 45, 66.

to Yale law school.¹²² Westmoreland performed admirably in high school achieving above average grades and serving as the senior class president.

In the fall of 1931, Westmoreland began his freshman year at the Citadel. During his time at the Citadel, Westmoreland began to consider seeking an appointment to Annapolis, motivated by an Annapolis Midshipman he met during a trip with an international group of Boy Scouts to France. He made a request through South Carolina Senator Jimmy Byrnes seeking appointment to the Naval Academy. The Senator, during his meeting with Westmoreland, instead convinced him to seek appointment to West Point. After the Senator's primary candidate fell out, Westmoreland, as first alternate, received the appointment and began his freshman year in 1932.¹²³

Westmoreland performed very well at West Point, while not the top cadet in academics, he was well respected and served as first captain his senior year. This honor recognized him as the top cadet in tactics and military bearing and placed him at the top the student chain of command. He also performed duties as a Sunday school teacher and was involved with the school newspaper, *The Howitzer*. During his final year at West Point, Westmoreland selected Artillery as his branch, and following graduation, he proceeded to Fort Sill, Oklahoma to conduct his initial training.¹²⁴

Westmoreland spent the remainder of his lieutenant years assigned to the Hawaii Division at Schofield Barracks. While there, he took civilian flying lessons and requested a transfer to the United States Army flight school, however, he had not fulfilled his two-year overseas requirement, and when the opportunity came for him to reapply; he received orders

¹²² William C. Westmorland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1989), 10. Ernest B. Furgurson, *Westmorland: The Inevitable General* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 35-42.

¹²³ William C. Westmorland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1989), 10-11. Ernest B. Furgurson, *Westmorland: The Inevitable General* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 47, 56-57, 77.

¹²⁴ Ernest B. Furgurson, *Westmorland: The Inevitable General* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 61, 74.

assigning him to Fort Bragg and the newly formed 9th Infantry Division.¹²⁵ The newly promoted captain took command of the 34th Field Artillery Battery before the division's deployment to Africa in support of the United States involvement in World War II. He remained with the division throughout the war fighting in Tunisia, Sicily, France, and Germany. He eventually rose to become its Chief of Staff and earning the temporary rank of colonel. Following the end of hostilities, Westmoreland assumed command of the 71st Infantry Division and oversaw its redeployment stateside, having turned over its German occupation duties to the 9th Infantry Division.¹²⁶

During the interwar years, Westmoreland married his wife Kitsy in May of 1947 and served as the 82nd Airborne Division Chief of Staff at his permanent rank of lieutenant colonel. In July of 1952, he took command of the 187th Regimental Combat Team, already fighting in Korea. He commanded the regiment for the remainder of its time in Korea and through its redeployment to Japan. Following this command, now Brigadier General Westmoreland spent a five-year assignment in the Pentagon, initially under the Army G-1. During this time, he argued for Army control of rotary wing aircraft over the Air Force. In 1960, Westmorland became the Commandant of Cadets at West Point and in July of 1963, he assumed command of the XVIII Airborne Corp at Fort Bragg with promotion to lieutenant general a short time later. He held this command for only six months before he departed to serve in a different capacity in Vietnam.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ William C. Westmorland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1989), 15-18. Ernest B. Furgurson, *Westmorland: The Inevitable General* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 80, 87-88.

¹²⁶ William C. Westmorland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1989), 18-20, 23. Ernest B. Furgurson, *Westmorland: The Inevitable General* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 94, 100, 147, 179.

¹²⁷ William C. Westmorland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1989), 20-25, 27-28, 32, 37-39. Ernest B. Furgurson, *Westmorland: The Inevitable General* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 189, 192-193, 205, 226, 243-244, 261, 279.

Conclusion

The civil-military relationship fostered by the Johnson Administration was unprecedented in its management of the Department of Defense and infighting displayed by the JCS.¹²⁸ The control exerted by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara has much to do with his ambitious nature, need for centralization of control, and distrust of senior military leaders. While President Johnson shared McNamara's distrust, he failed to check the Secretary's nature and need for control.¹²⁹ He relegated the unpopular and inconvenient war to McNamara. President Johnson was more concerned with pursuing his domestic policies.¹³⁰

General Westmoreland tailored his Vietnam strategy to satisfy the political goals and considerations and at the end, his attrition based approach bore little resemblance to the *hop tac* approach he proposed just before assuming command of MACV.¹³¹ Westmoreland's initial approach did resemble PROVN in some aspects, the eventual route taken once Abrams took over command of MACV. The inability of the JCS to put aside their inter-service rivalries and speak with one voice to the president and the Secretary of Defense prevented any hope that Westmoreland may have had for support or advice from his senior military officers.¹³²

¹²⁸ Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 158. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 114.

¹²⁹ Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Long War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 233-236. Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 150-152. Charles A. Stevenson, *Warriors and Politicians* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 156.

¹³⁰ Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 152-153. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 117, 243-244.

¹³¹ Louis Fisher, *Presidential War Power* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 133-134. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 245, 325. William C. Westmorland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1989), 153.

¹³² Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 167. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), 114.

This relationship typifies Huntington's vertical type in that it places the Secretary of Defense in a role described as assistant commander or deputy commander in chief.¹³³ President Johnson's reliance on Secretary McNamara to the exclusion of his senior military commander prevented direct access. This lack of direct access prevented President Johnson from fully understanding Westmoreland's assessment of the situation in Vietnam. Westmoreland's initial assessment bore more resemblance to the PROVN than it did to the war of attrition he eventually executed. President Johnson's concentration on domestic politics, utilization of a deputy commander and insulation from his senior military commander led to political aims that were both short sighted and unachievable with the military approach dictated by both himself and his Secretary. To Westmoreland's credit, he devised an approach in Vietnam that supported the political aims of his civilian leadership. His loyalty ensured that Johnson would not dismiss him in the way that Truman did MacArthur.

The political ideologies of President Johnson and General Westmoreland did not align, as is often the case with the liberal administrations. The one aspect of the pattern within their relationship that General Westmoreland could affect was the level of military political power applied. However as Huntington describes, the second pattern of civil military relations is characterized by an administration that "is so intensely pursued that it is impossible for the military to escape its influence no matter how far they reduce their political power."¹³⁴ This rendered any efforts by General Westmoreland ineffective, leaving him only one recourse—to maintain a high level of military professionalism. The similar personal backgrounds of the Johnson and Westmoreland, as well as the president's hand in personally selecting Westmoreland, played the largest part in his retention. President Johnson felt a loyalty to the

¹³³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 188.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 96-97.

general, perhaps because he saw Westmoreland as the instrument that was carrying out his policies in Vietnam. That loyalty shielded Westmoreland from public humiliation, and Johnson promoted him out of the situation.¹³⁵

Conclusion

The United States Constitution is vague on the powers of the president as to his relationship with the Armed Forces. The framers of the Constitution, while meticulous in the care they took in constructing the document, relied on precedent to determine the power that the president exerted. These framers respected and trusted George Washington, and with good reason. He set a fine example for future presidents; however, lack of adherence to this precedent and the absence of specific language in the Constitution have left the relationship between the Chief Executive and the military leadership open to interpretation.¹³⁶

The first case study provided insight into the relationship between President Wilson and General Pershing and stated that the relationship that these two men developed exemplified Huntington's balanced approach, despite the differences displayed in the personal backgrounds of the two men. Secondly, it is determined that the pattern that defined this relationship was Huntington's third pattern, which consists of an anti-military ideology, a low level of military power and a high level of military professionalism. The nature of WWI and America's reasons for entering the conflict supported the liberal ideology held by the president, additionally the low level of military political power prevented conflict with that ideology. The balanced type cannot be achieved if it is not coupled with the appropriate pattern. Had General Pershing pursued and increased level of military political power or if the level of military professionalism had not been

¹³⁵ Ernest B. Furgurson, *Westmoreland: The Inevitable General* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 286.

¹³⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 184-186. Charles A. Stevenson, *Warriors and Politicians* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 7.

high, it is unlikely that President Wilson would have ceded the same level of control to General Pershing resulting in a different type of civil-military relationship.

The second case study identified the type of relationship between President Truman and General MacArthur as the coordinated type. While this is not Huntington's ideal type, an effective relationship can result with the application of the appropriate pattern. The actual pattern that existed was Huntington's fourth pattern: pro-military ideology, high level of military political power and high level of military professionalism. The coordinated type can provide utility in that the direct access afforded to the military commander can lead to better synchronization of strategic goals and tactical actions, however, coupled with Huntington's type four pattern, the results can be disastrous. Had General MacArthur reduced the level of military political power and adhered to General Pershing's example, the resulting failure in the civil-military relationship need not occur. This reduction would define Huntington's fifth pattern: pro-military ideology, low level of military political power and high level of military professionalism.

The final case study, involving President Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Westmoreland defines Huntington's vertical type. The corresponding pattern of civil-military relations is Huntington's third pattern: anti-military ideology, low level of military political power and high level of military professionalism. This relationship did not prove to be the most ineffective, but did prove to be the most difficult to improve. While the military maintained a low level of political influence during this relationship, the administration did not work well with military leaders. The only recourse in this situation is to lower the level of military professionalism in order to change the balance in attempt to increase the effectiveness of this situation. This means military leaders lowering the level of loyalty to civilian leadership. This is not something that the American society and military is willing to accept, nor should it attempt to.

When comparing the three case studies it is apparent that, Huntington was correct in his assertion that the balanced type is more conducive in capitalizing on civilian leadership and

military professionalism. However, as he stated, this approach is also the most difficult to achieve and in most situations, the coordinated or vertical type will prevail.¹³⁷ Even President Wilson's administration exhibited characteristics of the coordinated type, with his involvement in military affairs in Mexico, before the successful relationship established with General Pershing. The non-balanced relationships are not in and of themselves bad, but they do incur greater risk. As the relationship between President Johnson and General Westmoreland demonstrates, the delegation of responsibility inherent to the office of the President of the United States can be perilous. President Johnson's use of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara resulted in a dysfunctional vertical relationship and a policy in Vietnam unaligned with the realities on the ground. This example bears some similarities to the problematic civil-military relations of our recent past. The almost tragic relationship between Truman and MacArthur illustrates the dangers that can arise from overexposure of a senior commander to the President and how this can go terribly wrong. MacArthur was unable or unwilling to recognize this boundary, while President Truman, overwhelmed by the combination of his duties as President and the overbearing personality of General MacArthur, did not address the problems in the relationship early on. Only when he viewed MacArthur as a political rival was he able to discipline and remove him from his position.

Analyzing how the personal aspects of individuals and how that affects a relationship are more difficult than framing the functionality of the relationship based on Huntington's typologies of civil-military relations. The conventional wisdom is that the more contrasts that exist between individuals, the more potential there is for conflict. However, when reviewing the military experience, region of origin, religion or religiosity, and political affiliation of those involved, the greatest amount of difference found in these four areas is between President Wilson and General

¹³⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 188.

Pershing. President Wilson had no military experience and came from the Southern state of Virginia and from a family that was pro-Confederacy. General Pershing, by contrast came from the divided state of Missouri and his family were fierce Unionist. While President Wilson's Presbyterianism factored greatly into his persona, religion did not seem to have a predominant role with Pershing. Finally, within the sphere of politics, the two men were absolute opposites. So how is it that these two opposites could have such an effective relationship? Huntington suggests, by implication only, that it is the influence of patterns of behavior, influenced by these backgrounds, that ultimately influences the relationship type, not the particular beliefs or backgrounds themselves. The cases reviewed here suggest that this correlation between the relationship type and patterns of behavior exist, even if Huntington did not directly say so.

With the patterns of civil-military relationships serving as the framework in analyzing personal background and the determination of the type of civil-military relationship being relatively straightforward, the true value of Huntington's work may be applied. While Huntington does not outwardly specify any direct correlation between the patterns and the types, examining these two models as a whole can provide deeper insight into the effectiveness of the civil-military relationship.

The first aspect of Huntington's patterns of civil-military relations is the political ideology. This is not as relevant for the military leader in that his ideology does not affect foreign policy to the extent that the president does, however, differences in ideology could lead to a poor relationship. Political ideology is extremely important when examining the president and to a lesser extent the Secretary of Defense. Political ideology correlates to the personal background of the president and what drove his pursuit of that ideology, additionally that ideology often reflects the majority opinion of the electorate responsible for his election to the presidency. More often than not, the president will also select a Secretary of Defense that reflects this ideology as well.

The level of military political power, Huntington's second aspect, involves both the backgrounds of the civilian and the military leadership. By examining the backgrounds, we may

determine the degree to which a military may be willing to seek increased levels of military political power, the degree to which political leaders will cede it. When General MacArthur exceeded President Truman's level of comfort, Truman no longer viewed him as a military commander but as political adversary.

The last aspect of the pattern, level of military professionalism, is harder to correlate to personal background; however, a high level of military professionalism may serve to prevent any attempts by a military leader to push the bounds of military political power or involvement, as was the case with Generals Pershing and Westmoreland, regardless of differences in political ideology.

Although Huntington considers the balanced type of civil-military relationship the most effective, the Constitution poorly positions military leaders to influence the construct directly. Military leaders can have the greatest influence, albeit indirectly, through the behaviors defining Huntington's patterns – political ideology, level of military political power and level of military professionalism. They must approach political ideology carefully, but the military can improve the trust of their civilian leaders, regardless of ideology, by maintaining high levels of military professionalism. This may not create the desired balance, but it can aid in having a voice in the dialog. The greatest degree of impact that military leaders can have on the type of relationship they have with their civilian masters is through maintaining the appropriate amount of military political power, which can be adjusted to make the overall relationship more effective.

Regardless of the patterns or type of relationship, it is ultimately the responsibility of all partners within the civil-military relationship to make the relationship work. Understanding the nature of these relationships, their typologies, and the patterns of interaction that influence their construction, maintenance, and potential failure, is the best means available to develop strategies for making these relationships cooperative and successful.

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